PhD in Political Science, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Doctor of History, Chief Scientific Officer, Institute of World History of the NAS of Ukraine
Abstract. The Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine, preceded by the war of the Russian Federation against Georgia, raised the question of a joint repulse of democratic states to actions aimed at undermining European stability. The problem of protecting small and medium-sized states from the threat posed by Russia has arisen in a new way. In this context, the inability of leading European states to stop the aggression of Nazi Germany is repeatedly mentioned. To assess the relevance of such parallels with modernity, the authors of this article seek to briefly and objectively analyse what was happening in the 1930s. The threat of a military catastrophe and complete destabilisation of Europe had been growing since 1933, when Hitler came to power in Germany. He and his entourage gradually dragged Europe into a series of international conflicts and the World War II. According to the authors of the article, the leading motive for the inaction of Western powers within the military and political allied cooperation was not the desire to balance Germany’s military power and thus deter aggression but the attempt to avoid involvement in a world war by appeasing Hitler. In pursuit of European stability, France aimed to secure the military support of as wide a range of European countries as possible, and Great Britain was seeking to build a stable European system without making clear military commitments to the continental powers. London felt at peace with Berlin’s continental ambitions, as they did not cover the seas. London entertained the illusion that its security could be guaranteed without interfering in the war on the mainland. The authors emphasise that only in a state of conscious self-blindness could Western politicians for years retain the illusion of the prospect of civilising and taming the German dictator by satisfying his whims. Such illusions, however, never concerned Stalin. In the pre-war period, the Stalinist regime did its best to prevent the Soviet Union from being involved in building a system of collective security in Europe. The authors come to the following conclusion: in an effort to preserve at least the remnants of stability in Europe, the states have consistently moved towards continuous destabilization and war.
Keywords: Europe, military and political union, World War II, Germany.
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